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"NFORMAL marriage. From time to time a lawyer-legislator who loses a
case will feel so strongly about the rightness of his client's cause that he
iwill introduce a measure to change the offending law. Thus, counsel for
the unsuccessful party felt that the conclusion reached by the Texas Supreme
Court in Estate of Claveria v. Claveria I was so outrageous that the doctrine
of informal marriage should be abolished. Many have criticized the applica-
tion of the law in Claveria,2 but most consider the abolition of the principle
of informal marriage too extrenRe a reaction. At the last regular session of
the legislature the losing counsel in Claveria proposed a bill to abolish the
doctrine. The House of Representatives voted 72 to 62 in favor of the bill,
but sensing that outright abolition would be unacceptable to the Senate, the
sponsor of the House bill appended a less extreme proposal to the omnibus
bill of Family Code amendments. Both houses of the legislature then ac-
ceded to that significant tightening of the law of informal marriage by re-
pealing that part of section 1.91 allowing a trial court to infer the agreement
to marry if the other two elements of an informal marriage are proved.
An informal marriage is usually asserted by a surviving party of a rela-
tionship who seeks the benefits of marriage or by a party to an existing rela-
tionship who seeks the division of the profits of marriage on divorce. In
Claveria the doctrine was asserted defensively. The heirs of a deceased wife
of a ceremonial marriage asserted that their mother's marriage was invalid
because her surviving husband married the decedent while married infor-
mally to someone else. Counsel supported the assertion that the survivor
was married informally at the time of his ceremonial marriage to the dece-
dent by showing his cohabitation with another woman and two instances of
the man's holding her out as his wife: once in a deposition given during the
period of cohabitation and later in an instrument executed by both cohabi-
tants as husband and wife. At the Claveria trial, however, both the survivor
and his alleged informal wife testified that they had not been married. Ap-
parently neither side of the dispute chose to make a full inquiry into all the
* B.A., The University of Texas; B.C.L., M.A., Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia.
University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. 615 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1981).
2. See, ag., McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
40 Sw. L.J. 1-2 (1986); McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 115 (1980).
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facts of the alleged informal marriage. The trial court found that a valid
informal marriage existed and was admittedly undissolved; hence the subse-
quent ceremonial marriage was invalid. The intermediate appellate court
concluded, however, that the informal marriage had not been adequately
proved. On writ of error to the Supreme Court of Texas, the court rein-
stated the trial court's inference of an agreement to be married in spite of the
direct testimony of the participants that they had never married. Under the
circumstances the trier of fact might have rejected the cohabitants' self-serv-
ing testimony as untruthful, but to hold that an inference of agreement could
be arrived at without such an explanation made the Supreme Court's opin-
ion hard to accept. The court's handling of the evidence suggested to some
that a trial court might infer an informal marriage on the basis of cohabita-
tion and holding out even when both parties deny the existence of an
agreement.
Rather than abolishing the doctrine of informal marriage as had been pro-
posed on numerous occasions in the past, the legislature tightened the rules
for reliance on the doctrine by repealing the provision that allowed a court
to infer an agreement to be married from proof of cohabitation and holding-
out. This amendment, therefore, raises the question of how the elements of
agreement may hereafter be proved.
In the future one of two basic fact patterns will develop depending on
whether both parties are living. If both parties to the alleged informal mar-
riage are alive, one of them will commonly deny the agreement. When the
other party to the alleged informal union offers direct evidence of an express
agreement to be presently married, the trier of fact will be required to weigh
the testimony in the context of other evidence of the relationship. If one of
the parties is dead, the survivor will be required to meet the limitation im-
posed by Evidence Rule 601(b) 3 by providing corroboration of an alleged
transaction with the decedent. Under most circumstances the proponent of
the marriage will have an easier case in the latter instance unless there is
convincing evidence that the decedent denied the existence of the agree-
ment.4 If evidence of an express agreement to marry is not offered, the fact
finder will have to treat the facts of cohabitation and holding-out as circum-
stantial evidence of the agreement in order to find a tacit agreement to be
married. This process is, however, virtually identical to the prior process of
inference. But by repealing the provision authorizing the fact-finder to infer
an agreement from proof of two elements of an informal marriage, the legis-
lature has not excluded a finding of a tacit agreement to be married. In
making such a finding, however, it seems that the evidence of holding-out
must be more convincing than before the 1989 amendment.
In a society in which non-marital cohabitation for extended periods of
time is far more common than it once was, the fact-finder will have to weigh
3. TEx. R. CIV. EVID. 601(b).
4. Evidence that the decedent had said that he was not married and filed a separate
income tax return was not sufficient to deter the statutory inference in In re Estate of Giessell,
734 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1988, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the evidence of a tacit agreement more carefully than in the past. As the
statute now stands, an occasional uncontradicted reference to a cohabitant
as "my wife" or "my husband" or "mine" will not prove a tacit agreement to
be married without corroboration. Such a reference by the contestant of the
union will, of course, be stronger evidence of an agreement than such a state-
ment by the proponent. The non-social context of the contestant's reference
to the proponent as his "wife" or her "husband" will also receive closer
scrutiny. If the statement is made in a self-serving context,5 the fact-finder
may be expected to disbelieve the truth of the statement. A forthright asser-
tion of marriage with the consequence of liability (as when an alleged spouse
seeks admission of the other to a hospital)' may, on the other hand be far
more probative of a tacit agreement to be married.
Under section 1.91 as it now stands, the fact-finder will also tend to give
greater weight to testimony indicating the state of mind of either party that a
marriage did not exist during the period of cohabitation. Hence, if either
cohabitant stated that the couple planned to get married at a future time the
non-existence of a subsisting marriage is suggested. But such a conclusion
does not necessarily follow. The speaker's reference may be to a subsequent
ceremonial marriage for the benefit of family members, although the couple
already consider themselves married.7 During the 1960s and 1970s, but per-
haps less commonly today, some couples rejected the notion of ceremonial
marriage and knowingly asserted an informal marriage. If such a relation-
ship is shown, it seems unlikely that the fact-finder would reject such evi-
dence of an informal marriage.
In amending section 1.91 the legislature added a new subsection providing
that "[a] proceeding in which a marriage is to be proved under this section,
must be commenced not later than one year after the date on which the
relationship ended or not later than one year after September 1, 1989."8 The
word "relationship" in this context must mean cohabital relationship rather
than marital relationship. If the couple had previously recorded their infor-
5. A deponent's reference to his marital situation in order to show his stable family rela-
tionship and thus to bolster his veracity is another example. Lenders are frequently more
willing to make a loan to a couple than to a single person. Thus asserting a marriage in such
an instance may be regarded as essentially self-serving.
6. But the proponent's listing of her divorced husband as her spouse in an application for
admission to a hospital would not have much, if any, probative force in proving an informal
marriage. See Warren v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 868 F.2d 1444, 1446 (5th
Cir. 1989). Other evidence offered by the proponent in that case is not specified.
7. See Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987, en bane). The
precise evidence of agreement in this case is not specified. The most unusual aspect of the case
is that the court treated cohabitation as husband and wife and an agreement to be presently
married as proved. Holding-out, however, was not proved. Id. At the time of the trial Tax.
CRIM. PROP. CODE ANN. art. 38.11 (Vernon 1979) generally allowed the prisoner to assert a
privilege against spousal testimony contrary to his position, hence the concern for proving an
informal marriage. Under TEx. IL CUM. EvID. 504(2)(a), which replaced art. 38.11 on Sep-
tember 1, 1986, a spouse can be compelled to testify in crimes against members of either
spouse's household except when the crime is committed against the spouse. See Fuentes v.
State, 775 S.W.2d 64, 65-67 (rex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1989, no writ).
8. T x. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990). The comma between the
words "section" and "must" is a typographical error in the enactment.
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mal marriage under sections 1.92, 1.93 and 1.94,9 however, the marriage
would not be provable merely "under this section" but under sections 1.92
through 1.94, compliance with which renders the sworn assertions prima
facie evidence of the marriage.' 0
If a party alleges an informal marriage in a petition for divorce, an award
of temporary alimony may be granted in the discretion of the trial judge
pending a determination of the validity of the marriage, although the valid-
ity of the union is questioned.II If validity is set for determination and that
issue alone is affirmatively resolved, such a conclusion is interlocutory and
not then subject to appeal.' 2
Annulment. At its 1989 regular session the legislature also added a new
subsection to section 2.4813 enacted in 1978 to complement the provision of
section 1.82(c), 14 which provides that a ceremonial marriage may not be
conducted within seventy-two hours of the issuance of the marriage license.
As provided in 1989, a suit to avoid a marriage entered into in violation of
section 2.48(a) must be brought not more than thirty days after the cere-
mony. If the parties chose to enter into an informal marriage within sev-
enty-two hours of receiving a license to be married ceremonially, they are
free to do so. Such a marriage is clearly not subject to the strictures of either
section 1.82 or 2.48.
Ground for Divorce. Once an informal marriage is established it has all
the effects of a ceremonial marriage. Texas law also does not distinguish
between a civil and religious ceremonial marriage. Although various argu-
ments have been unsuccessfully advanced to defeat the applicability of the
insupportability ground' s for divorce, no inroad has been made in favor of
establishing that one type of marriage is more indissoluble than another. It
has been frivolously asserted, for example, that a Christian marriage solem-
nized by a religious ceremony is immune from attack except on Biblical
grounds. 16 In Zetune v. Jafif-Zetune,17 Mexican nationals had been civilly
married in Mexico and subsequently entered into a Jewish religious cere-
mony. In her petition for divorce the wife merely alleged the date of the
Jewish marriage, and the divorce was granted. The husband attacked the
9. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.92-1.94 (Vernon 1975).
10. See McKnight, TEXAS FAMILY CODE SYMPOSIUM, 13 TaX. TECH L. REv. 651
(1982).
11. See Garduno v. Garduno, 760 S.W.2d 735, 742 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no
writ).
12. Winfield v. Daggett, 775 S.W.2d 431, 433 (rex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1989, no
writ). For an instance in which the divorce-petitioner asserted an informal marriage but later
moved for a nonsuit after the respondent asserted claims for affirmative relief including sanc-
tions for frivolous pleadings, see Page v. Page, 780 S.W.2d 1, 2-3 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1989, no writ).
13. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.48(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
14. Id. § 1.82(c).
15. Id. § 3.01.
16. Trickey v. Trickey, 642 S.W.2d 47, 50 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ). See
McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw. LJ. 131,
135-36 (1984).
17. 774 S.W.2d 387 (rex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
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decree on the ground that it purported to dissolve only the religious mar-
riage and failed to address the prior and effective civil marriage.18 The ap-
pellate court brushed this argument aside with the comment that the trial
court dissolved the marital relationship, not a particular ceremony.19
Although it is somewhat unusual for a spouse to rely on a fault ground for
divorce, such reliance still occurs and must be supported by pleading of the
ground.20 Hence, if the fault ground is not plead but the issue is raised by
the evidence, the pleadings require a trial amendment.21 A trial by consent
will not be implied by failure to object to the testimony if an objection to
submission of the issue fails because of lack of support in the pleadings.22
Emotional Distress. In Chiles v. Chiles23 the intermediate appellate court
held that Texas law does not recognize a cause of action for emotional dis-
tress coupled with a suit for divorce. The court justified its refusal to allow
such a recovery by noting that permitting an award of damages for such a
cause "would result in evils similar to those avoided by the legislature's ab-
rogation of fault as a ground of divorce." 24 While the court did not identify
those evils and did not seem to be aware that the legislature had not abro-
gated fault as a ground for divorce in Texas, the lack of a cause of action for
infliction of purely emotional distress between spouses is certainly consistent
with the legislative abrogation of recovery by one spouse for alienation of
affection by a third party"5 because the free will of the other spouse is gener-
ally deemed a fundamental element in the process of alienation.
Intercepted Evidence. In finding reversible error for the use of wiretapped
evidence, the Dallas court of appeals declined 26 to follow Simpson v. Simp-
son,27 where the federal court found an exception to the federal anti-wiretap
statute28 in the case of an interspousal wiretap on a residential telephone. In
refusing to grant a writ of error the Texas Supreme Court made it plain that
it left open the question of admissibility of intercepted evidence in such
situations.
18. In Mexico a civil marriage is required. A subsequent religious marriage may be en-
tered into but is superfluous for civil purposes. A religious marriage standing alone is ineffec-
tive for civil purposes.
19. Zetune, 774 S.W.2d at 389.
20. Hirsch v. Hirsch, 770 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, no writ).
21. Tax. R. Civ. P. 66-67.
22. Hirsch, 770 S.W.2d at 926.
23. 779 S.W.2d 127, 131 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ granted).
24. Id. at 131.
25. Although the legislature abolished a cause of action for alienation of affection as of
September 1, 1987, TEx FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.05 (Vernon Supp. 1990), the court held in
Turner v. PV Internat'l Corp., 765 S.W.2d 455, 467-68 (rex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ),
that the statute of limitation for recovery of damages for an already vested cause of action for
alienation of affection runs for two years from the discovery of the cause of action. TEx. Crv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon. 1986).
26. Turner v. PV Int'l Corp., 765 S.W.2d 455, 470 (rex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ ref'd
n.r.e., sub nom. PV Int'l Corp. v. Turner, 700 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex. 1989)).
27. 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974), commented on in
McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. LJ. 105,
107 (1977).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1988).
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In Fabian v. Fabian 29 in an effort to avoid the barrier of Simpson in the
appeal of a divorce case, the wife objected to evidence derived from inter-
cepted messages on a residential telephone, stating that the planting of a
wiretap is criminal under Texas law.30 The trial court, however, refused to
admit evidence that the husband had obtained solely on the basis of the wire-
tap. On the state of the record before it, the appellate court found no evi-
dence that the trial court admitted that caused the rendition of an improper
judgment.
II. CHARACTERIZATION
Premarital and Marital Partitions. After the amendment of article XVI,
section 15 of the Texas Constitution3' in 1980 to allow premarital and mari-
tal partitions of future acquisitions of community property, the legislature
provided statutory implementation of the amendment to take effect on Sep-
tember 1, 1981. Section 5.4532 required the proponent of a partition to
demonstrate its validity "by clear and convincing evidence that the other
party against whom enforcement of the agreement is sought gave informed
consent [to the transaction] and that the agreement was not procured by
fraud, duress, or overreaching. '33 This burden of proof proved to be unduly
arduous for proponents of partitions. To dispose of this rule, the Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act was enacted in 1987 along with additional provi-
sions to cover marital partitions.
Under the new provisions for enforcement of premarital and marital parti-
tions, 34 the burden of proof of invalidity is put upon the contestant, who may
rely on either of two grounds in proving the invalidity of the partition. First,
he or she may demonstrate mere lack of volition in making the partition. If
it is conceded that the partition was entered into voluntarily, the contestant
may attack the partition on a second ground which has two elements:
(1) that the complainant lacked adequate knowledge of the other party's
financial situation and did not waive receipt of that information in writing
and (2) that the partition was unconscionable when executed. The disclo-
sure element is a matter of fact. The element of unconscionability is a matter
of law but is not defined. The 1987 act3" provides that its terms become
effective on September 1, 1987 but does not specify whether it is to apply to
contests concerning partitions entered into prior to that date. The Texas
Supreme Court defined general policy with regard to this sort of problem in
29. 765 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, no writ).
30. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 16.02 (Vernon Supp. 1990). Cf Kotrla v. Kotrla, 718
S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1986 (writ ref'd n.r.e.) (husband's tape-recorded
conversation with wife not admissible under the Texas interception statute); TEx. Civ. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 123.002 (Vernon 1986).
31. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
32. 1981 TEx. GEN. LAWS 2964, 2964-65, ch. 782, § 2.
33. Id.
34. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.46 (premarital partitions), 5.55 (marital partitions)
(Vernon Supp. 1990).
35. 1987 TEx. GEN. LAWS 2530, 2533 ch. 678, § 3.
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Wesseley Energy Corp. v. Jennings36 in saying that "[t]he law existing at the
time a contract is made becomes a part of the contract and governs the
transaction. '37 The court also stated in a per curiam opinion in Sadler v.
Sadler38 that it was inappropriate to apply the 1987 act to a marital parti-
tion in that case because at the time of trial and entry ofjudgment the 1981
statute was still in effect.39 In two subsequent cases-one dealing with a
marital partition4" and the other dealing with a premarital partition4 1-
courts of appeal followed the literal language of Sadler and applied the stat-
ute in effect at the date of the trial. Although the burden of proof provisions
of sections 5.46 and 5.55 may be described as procedural rules that ordina-
rily apply to the conduct of suits brought after the enactment of procedural
reforms,42 their effect is decidedly substantive. As such, under the rule of
the Wesseley case the law in force when the transaction occurred would seem
properly applicable. This point is accentuated by the fact that a partition
may be more likened to a conveyance than to a mere contract. What was
said in Sadler, somewhat offhandedly, may have merely meant that the law
in effect at the trial should have been applied in that case, because it was the
law in effect when the marital partition was executed.
With one judge dissenting, the court in Daniel v. Daniel 43 adopted the
argument that there are other general defenses to the fundamental validity of
marital partitions besides those specifically enumerated in the statute. If
such defenses exist, they are equally applicable to premarital partitions. On
its face, however, the defenses provided in the statute seem to be exclusive.
A Louisiana bankruptcy court produced a useful precedent in relation to
the argument that a marital partition made when a spouse is in financial
difficulty may be a fraudulent transfer. The court held that such a transac-
tion is, not necessarily per se fraudulent. 4 This decision complements the
earlier Florida federal court's conclusion that a conveyance pursuant to a
premarital agreement does not necessarily constitute a fraudulent transfer.45
The federal Tax Court has provided a peculiarly mistaken gloss of the
36. 736 S.W.2d 624, 626 (rex. 1987). This case dealt with the validity of a contract and
conveyance made by the wife alone at a time when the statute required her husband's joinder
in such a transaction. The court held that the statute would have controlled the matter before
it but for the unconstitutionality of the statute. The point is reiterated in the context of a
constitutional amendment's not affecting a situation occurring prior to the adoption of the
amendment in Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-991 (1988).
37. 736 S.W.2d at 626.
38. 769 S.W.2d 886 (rex. 1989).
39. Id.
40. Daniel v. Daniel, 779 S.W.2d 110, 114 (rex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no
writ).
41. Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ
granted).
42. Daniel v. Daniel, 779 S.W.2d 110, 114 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no
writ).
43. Id. at 114.
44. In re Pietri, 14 C.B.C. 2d Ser. 651, 655 (Bankr. Ct., M.D. La. 1986).
45. Miele v. United States, 637 F. Supp. 998, 1000 (S.D. Fia. 1986).
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property settlement 46 and marital partition47 statutes. In Abram v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue,48 the court held that a spousal agreement to sepa-
rate constitutes an agreement to partition community property. Such a
conclusion is wholly unwarranted.
Inception of Title Rule. The Texas Constitution49 makes it clear that
property acquired by a spouse prior to marriage is that spouse's separate
property. Although property on hand "on dissolution of marriage is pre-
sumed to be community property," °50 the presumption is rebutted by a show-
ing that particular property was a premarital acquisition. In Dawson v.
Dawson,51 both spouses testified that certain property had been purchased by
the husband under a contract for deed prior to marriage. The seller con-
veyed the property to both spouses during marriage after substantial pay-
ments were made with community property. Once the husband proved that
he entered the contract of purchase prior to marriage, the court held that the
property was the husband's separate property.5 2 Because the property was
the husband's separate estate, a further burden, overlooked by the court, fell
upon the husband to account for the title in the names of both spouses. This
burden arose because there is a presumption of gift of one-half of the prop-
erty when separate property is conveyed to both spouses.
53
The continuing personal service contract, sometimes extending over a pe-
riod prior to marriage, during marriage and following dissolution of mar-
riage by divorce or death of the other spouse, presents some difficult
questions in relation to the inception of title rule. It is fundamental to this
analysis that the subject matter is a personal contract by which an individual
agrees to render services over a period of time in return for compensation.
The chose in action created by the contract is personal to the contractor and
personally enforceable. Liability for breach is also personal, although recov-
ery may be had from either separate or community assets. Compensation
for services received by the contractor is separate property if the services are
rendered when the contractor is single; compensation is community property
if the services are performed during marriage.54 If the compensation agreed
to while the contractor is single is to be paid by a conveyance of particular
property, that property is characterized as separate property,55 even though
the services are yet to be performed and the transfer of title may not occur
46. Tax. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 3.631 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
47. Id. § 5.55.
48. USTC 11989-462, 15 F.L.R. 1529 (1989).
49. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
50. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon Supp. 1990). The spouse asserting a separate
property interest has the burden of overcoming the community presumption. See Hudson v.
Hudson, 763 S.W.2d 603, 605-06 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
51. 767 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ).
52. Id. at 951.
53. Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 167-68 (Tex. 1975); Smith v. Strahan, 16
Tex. 314, 320-21 (1856).
54. In re Joiner, 766 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, no writ).
55. Welder v. Lambert, 91 Tex. 510, 520, 526, 44 S.W. 281, 284 (1898); Evans v. Ingram,
288 S.W. 494, 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1926, no writ); Bishop v. Williams, 223 S.W. 512,
515 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1920, writ ref'd).
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until a later time, perhaps while the contractor is married.5 6 Similarly, if a
particular property is contracted for during marriage but is to be paid for by
the performance of services, the property accedes to the contract when the
contract is made and is community property even though the services ren-
dered may be performed after the marriage has been dissolved.5 7
Funds in an employee's pension or retirement trust may be accumulated
over a number of years. These funds may be attributable to compensation
earned while the employee was both married and single. When ultimately
received, the pension is treated as deferred compensation and is prorated
between the separate and community estates on a proportional basis depend-
ing on the length of time the employee earned the funds when married or
single.58
In the case of a recovery for personal injury that is compensation for loss
of earnings, the recovery is characterized as separate or community depend-
ing on whether the employee was single or married when the loss occurred.
Earnings lost while single are separate property, and those lost while mar-
ried are community property.5 9 Recovery for pain and suffering is, on the
other hand, separate property regardless of the marital status of the recipi-
ent.60 When a spouse suffers personal injury during marriage and recovery
is not achieved until after the marriage is dissolved, there is a question with
respect to which former spouse has the burden of demonstrating these di-
verse property interests. The situation is analogous to that of undivided pen-
sion trust benefits enhanced after divorce. In a carefully reasoned decision,61
Chief Justice Guittard of the Dallas court concluded that the employee-for-
mer spouse should bear the burden of distinguishing between the separate
and community elements of the recovery because he was the cotenant in
charge of the asset and thus had access to the facts necessary to demonstrate
the separate part of the property claimed as his own. In Berry v. Berry 62 the
Texas Supreme Court seemed to confirm this burden of proof. Most re-
cently, in Moreno v. Alejanero,63 a personal injury award left undivided on
divorce was at issue. The court put the burden of demonstrating the com-
56. Id. See also Carter v. Carter, 736 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987,
no writ) (character of title as seperate or community depends upon date of inception of title);
Roach v. Roach, 672 S.W.2d 524, 531 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, no writ) (origin or incep-
tion of title occurs when party has right or claim to property by which title is finally vested);
Wierzchula v. Wierzchula, 623 S.W.2d 730, 731a (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1981
no writ) (the character of property as separate or community is determined at time of inception
of title).
57. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 410 S.W.2d 260, 263 (rex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
58. Berry v. Berry, 647 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. 1983); Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422,
424 (Tex. 1977); Busby v.Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 552, 554 (Tex. 1970).
59. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(c) (Vernon 1975); Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390,
392 (rex. 1972); Hicks v. Hicks, 546 S.W.2d 71, 73-74 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ)
(worker's compensation benefits).
60. Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 393 (rex. 1972).
61. Dessommes v. Dessommes, 505 S.W.2d 673, 679 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
62. 647 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1983).
63. 775 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1989, writ denied).
1990]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
munity element on the injured spouse who received the recovery. Although
the community presumption is inapplicable because the marriage had long
since terminated and community property, as such, no longer existed, the ex-
spouse who had control of the common fund should bear the burden of
showing which part of it was his own.
Interest in Business Entities. In Harris v. Harris6 the attorney-husband
owned a separate interest in a professional partnership prior to marriage.
The partnership owned a contingent-fee interest in the outcome of a client's
litigation. The fee-contract was, therefore, partnership property and not
marital property.65 During the marriage, by agreement of the partners, the
partnership clarified the shares of the partners in the contingent-fee interest.
The court concluded that the husband's share in the contingent fee, so de-
fined, related back to the acquisition of the contingent fee. 66 Thus, when the
contingent-fee proceeds were divided among the partners, the husband took
his share as separate property. 67 The court therefore treated the distribution
of partnership funds as a partial liquidation of the partnership. 68 If uncom-
pensated time had been spent on the contingent matter, the community
might have claimed reimbursement for that time.69 But because the partner-
husband's share in the proceeds of the partnership was not affected by his
time spent on the contingent matter, the community had no entitlement to
reimbursement.70
Tracing. In Martin v. Martin 7 1 the husband owned two lots as his sepa-
rate property and acquired a third lot during marriage as community prop-
erty. All three lots were sold in 1983 for $100,000. The husband died in
1985. No evidence suggested how much of the purchase price the buyer
allocated to each lot. A real estate appraiser testified that the lots together
were worth $395,000 and that the community lot was worth $350,000 in
1987 but that the value of the lots had not changed appreciably since the sale
in 1983. The court concluded 72 that the evidence failed to show clearly and
convincingly the sales price of the separate lots, and hence the community
presumption prevailed with respect to the proceeds of sale on hand at the
husband's death.
Reimbursement. In Martin v. Martin 73 the court also considered a claim
for reimbursement on the part of the community for discharging a separate
64. 765 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).
65. Id. at 802.
66. Id. at 803-04.
67. Id. at 804.
68. See Akers, Community and Separate Property Characterization of Closely Held Corpo-
rate Stocks in Texas, 14 COMM. PROP. J. 9, 39 (1987).
69. See Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Tex. 1984).
70. 765 S.W.2d at 805-06. "While several documents relevant to the payment and distri-
bution of the fee suggest to us a correlation between the time expended on the case and alloca-
tion of profit, no evidence that [the husband's] interest was tied to his performance on the case
was introduced." Id. at 806.
71. 759 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
72. Id. at 466-67.
73. 759 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).
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debt on the wife's separate property.74 The court concluded that the realiza-
tion of such a claim did not depend on showing enhancement in the value of
the separate property.75 The court also alluded to the dubious "net-opera-
tions" approach by which a successful claim for interest, taxes, and insur-
ance can not be asserted unless it is shown that expenditures by the
community are greater than benefits received. 76 Because the community es-
tate has an absolute right to the produce of separate property, it is difficult to
understand why a netting-out approach is made with respect to profits in one
instance but not the other. The court, however, remanded the claim for
further findings of fact because the testimony addressed was insufficient to
sustain the claim.
Retirement Benefits. On two occasions the Supreme Court of Texas has
considered the extent of a community interest of a non-pensioner spouse in
retirement benefits of the pensioner spouse when the non-pensioner dies first.
In Allard v. Frech 77 the court held that when no provision is made concern-
ing the right of the non-pensioner in a private retirement plan, the non-pen-
sioner's community interest in the plan subsists after the non-pensioner's
death. In Valdez v. Ramirez78 the court held that for a federal Civil Service
retirement plan, if the pensioner-spouse discharges her powers of sole man-
agement of the community interest in the plan by making a choice of survi-
vorship benefits in the interest of the non-pensioner, but the non-pensioner
died first, the non-pensioner's benefits in the plan terminated. In Hoppe v.
Godeke79 the Austin Court of Appeals dealt with a case of federal Civil
Service retirement plan that had been the subject of a property settlement
agreement on divorce. The agreement provided that the pensioner-husband
retained all interest in his retirement benefits except a portion of the annuity
payments and a former-spouse's survival annuity. The court therefore con-
strued the agreement as meaning that the interests retained by the non-pen-
sioner did not include her share of the benefits of her ex-husband in the event
she should predecease him.80
Agreement for Survivorship to Community Property. At the 1989 regular
legislative session, the legislature enacted statutes81 to regulate and clarify
the process of making and enforcing written agreements between spouses
regarding the right of survivorship to community property pursuant to the
constitutional amendment of 1987.82 Although some interpretative com-
mentary on the constitutional provision and these statutes has begun to ap-
74. For comments on a similar situation dealing with community payment of an indebted-
ness on the husband's separate property, see Dawson v. Dawson, 767 S.W.2d 949, 951-52 (rex.
App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ) (Brookshire, J, concurring).
75. 759 S.W.2d at 465.
76. Id.
77. 754 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. 1989), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 788, 102 L. Ed. 2d 779 (1989).
78. 574 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. 1978).
79. 774 S.W.2d 368 (rex. App.-Austin 1989, no writ).
80. Id. at 371.
81. Tx. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 451-462 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
82. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
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pear,83 no appellate decision has yet dealt with the subject.
III. MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY
Solely and Jointly Managed Community Property. In a criminal case84 the
prisoner-husband moved to suppress certain evidence acquired by the prose-
cution as a result of a warrantless search of the community home to which
the police were given access by the prisoner's estranged wife. Relying on
section 5.22(c),8 5 the court argued that the community premises were subject
to joint management of the spouses and hence that one spouse acting alone
might give consent to search the home.86 In accepting the first element of
that argument, the court failed to appreciate the significance of the exception
embodied in the statute:
Except as provided in subsection (a), the community property is subject
to the joint management.., of the husband and wife, unless the spouses
provide otherwise by ... agreement.87
Hence, without a showing that subsection (a) does not apply, subsection (c)
is not operative. But even if the premises had been subject to joint manage-
ment, joint management means acting in concert, not singly. Although the
wife's possession of a key to the house suggested an agreement of sole access
on her part, the fact that the wife had removed all of her possessions from
the house further suggested a subsequent tacit understanding that she had
relinquished sole access to her husband. In spite of this initial misapplica-
tion of community property doctrine to a non-marital property dispute,
however, in suppressing the evidence the court looked to the prisoner's indi-
vidual right of privacy rather than prosecution arguments based on property
rights.18
Community Survivor. Prior to the appointment of an administrator of a
deceased wife's estate, her surviving husband collected unpaid wages due his
wife by her employer. After the administrator was appointed, he brought
suit against the employer for the amount already paid. The court held89 that
payment to the surviving spouse prior to appointment of the personal repre-
sentative was proper under section 160 of the Probate Code.90 The employer
therefore had no liability to the administrator.
Doctrine of Equitable Election. The doctrine of equitable election arises as
83. See Henkel, Community Property with Right of Survivorship, 28 STATE BAR OP TEXAS
REAL ESTATE, PROBATE AND TRusT BAR NEWSLETTER 24 (no. 2, Jan. 1990); Schlueter,
Community Property Survivorship Agreements under Texas Law: A Modern Cure with Poten-
tially Dangerous Side Effects 1 COMMUNIrY PROPERTY ALERT I (No. 6, Sept. 1989).
84. May v. State, 780 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
85. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22(c) (Vernon 1975). See also Caulley v. Caulley, 777
S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ) (In the absence of evidence
that community property is subject to the wife's sole management, property is deemed to be
jointly managed.).
86. May, 780 S.W.2d at 869.
87. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22(c) (Vernon 1975).
88. May, 780 S.W.2d at 870.
89. Nelson v. Dallas Independent School District, 774 S.W.2d 380, 382-83 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1989, no writ).
90. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 160 (Vernon 1980).
[Vol. 44
HUSBAND AND WIFE
a consequence of an implied conditional testamentary devise or bequest.
When a testator disposes of certain property to. a beneficiary and also dis-
poses of property owned by that beneficiary in favor of another person, the
beneficiary must choose between the benefit provided by the testator and his
own property which the testator purported to dispose of as his own. The
benefit provided by the testator to the legatee is therefore conditioned on
relinquishment of the legatee's right to the other property by allowing it to
pass as directed by the testator.91 Thus, the Texas Supreme Court held in
195192 that when the husband-testator provided that his interest in the com-
munity homestead should pass to his wife and daughter "share and share
alike," his widow received a benefit but at the same time was deprived of sole
occupancy to which she was entitled as a surviving spouse. The widow was
therefore put to an election between those rights. Similarly, in Churchill v.
Churchill93 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that a widow might be
put to an election between benefits provided in her husband's will and a
clearly expressed intention that she be deprived of her statutory right to a
widow's allowance. 94 In this instance, however, the court found that the
testator's intention to deprive his widow of an allowance was not clearly
shown.95 With one judge dissenting, the court also held that by promptly
giving away her separate property, which would have been considered in her
claim of an allowance, the widow did not forfeit her right to the allowance,
because the property disposed of would not have been sufficient to provide
for her maintenance.96 But the fact that a party's separate property is insuf-
ficient for her maintenance does not excuse a court's consideration of its
value in fixing the allowance.
Spousal Agency. Spousal agency and related topics of spousal liability and
wives' contractual capacity have long plagued Texas law. With the recogni-
tion of full contractual capacity of married women in 196397 and the redefi-
nition of community property liability in 1967,98 many hoped that the
confusion of the law would be dispelled, but, it only seems to have been
abated. Misapprehension of the rules of management and liability of com-
munity property became so widespread99 that it was necessary to enact sec-
91. Wright v. Wright, 154 Tex. 138, 147, 274 S.W.2d 670, 676-77 (1955).
92. Miller v. Miller, 149 Tex. 543, 546-50, 235 S.W.2d 624, 626-628 (1951). See Akers,
Community and Separate Property Characterization of Closely Held Corporate Stocks in Texas,
14 COMM. PROP. J. 9, 28-29 (1987).
93. 780 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
94. See Lindsley v. Lindsley, 139 Tex. 512, 519-22, 163 S.W.2d 633, 637 (1942).
95. Cf. Trousdale v. Trousdale, 35 Tex. 746 (1872).
96. Churchill, 780 S.W.2d at 916.
97. 1963 TEx. GEN. LAWS 1188, ch. 472, § 6.
98. 1967 TEx. GEN. LAWS 739, ch. 309, § 1.
99. Rush v. Montgomery Ward, 757 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1988, no writ); Wileman v. Wade, 665 S.W.2d 519, 520 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ);
Anderson v. Royce, 624 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Brazosport Bank v. Robertson, 616 S.W.2d 363, 366-67 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1981, no writ); Inwood Nat'l Bank v. Hoppe, 596 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
1990]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
tion 4.0311 0 in 1987, and the legislature clarified that section in 1989.101
Although isolated comments suggest that some misunderstanding of spousal
liability still subsists, 10 2 judicial understanding of these matters has im-
proved. As an example of this improved perception of the rules of spousal
agency the court in Marynick v. Bockelmann 10 3 reiterated "the long-stand-
ing rule that 'the marital relationship does not in itself make one spouse the
agent of the other.' ,o4 In a situation in which a wife's liability to provide
necessaries for her husband was not proved, the court found that the hus-
band's contract with his landlord for a loan in the form of temporary abate-
ment of rent did not impose any liability on his wife.105
In Caulley v. Caulley,106 however, the Houston Fourteenth District Court
of Appeals seriously erred by applying the liability provisions of the Family
Code.107 The court failed to perceive the difference between rules of man-
agement and rules concerning liability of community property. Although
the court correctly stated that a judgment against a husband to which his
wife was not a party does not affect the property rights of the wife arising
from her management powers,108 that conclusion cannot be extended to a
liability context because section 5.61(c)109 specifically provides that all com-
munity property subject to a spouse's sole management is subject to his or
her liabilities. Thus, the wife's share of the community property encum-
bered by the debt as wel as his own share is liable in that circumstance.
In Medaris v. United States 110 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied
the liability rules in a federal tax dispute. The analysis is complicated by
intrusion of the federal Supremacy Doctrine, but the analysis is nonetheless
easier than the court made it. The court's opinion does not explain how the
husband's tax liability arose, but the Internal Revenue Service sought to
reach all of the husband's income and half of that of his wife to satisfy the
husband's sole tax liability. Relying principally on the management provi-
sions of the Family Code'1 and some older federal authorities,112 the appel-
late court concluded that the Service may reach all of the husband's earnings
and his half of his wife's earnings to satisfy the husband's liability.113 A
100. 1987 2d Spec. Sess. Tex. Gen. Laws 159, ch. 50, § 4 at 161.
101. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.031 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
102. It is true, of course, that "debts contracted during marriage are presumed to be on the
credit of the community," as stated in Sunbelt Service Corp. v. Vandenburg, 774 S.W.2d 815,
817 (rex. App.-El Paso 1989, no writ), but the relevance of the statement in its context is not
clear.
103. 773 S.W.2d 665, 670-71 (rex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ granted on other grounds).
104. Wilkinson v. Stevison, 514 S.W.2d 895, 898 (Tex. 1974).
105. Marynick, 773 S.W.2d at 670-71.
106. 777 S.W.2d 147, 150-51 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).
107. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
108. See Cooper v. Texas Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200, 202 (rex. 1974); see also
Dulak v. Dulak, 513 S.W.2d 205, 207 (rex. 1974) (judgment against husband does not affect
management rights of wife).
109. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(c) (Vernon 1975).
110. 884 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1989).
111. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (Vernon 1975).
112. United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971).
113. 884 F.2d at 834.
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more direct analysis in terms of liability follows these propositions. First, all
the husband's income, as his solely managed community property, is subject
to his liability under section 5.61(b). 1 14 Second, if there is no jointly man-
aged community, 115 no further community property would be subject to
seizure for an ordinary debt. But because a debt is owed to the federal gov-
ernment, the Supremacy Doctrine allows Congress to make the husband's
half of the wife's solely managed community property liable for claims of the
United States.116 Contrary to the court's intimation,11 7 however, the con-
cept of spousal debt-exemption no longer exists under Texas law in this con-
text. Each spouse's liability is independent of that of the other spouse.
In another context related to federal tax liability, the Texarkana court of
appeals dealt with some difficult problems of an alleged implied agency of
tax-professionals hired by the husband in a situation having severe repercus-
sions on the rights of his wife.118 The spouses initially filed joint federal
income tax returns. Although the wife thought that her husband had filed
returns regularly thereafter, no returns were filed for a period of six years.
The federal government indicted the husband for failure to file these returns.
He consulted an attorney who referred him to an accountant to prepare the
unfiled returns. The attorney explained the husband's predicament to the
wife and told her that the returns needed to be filed, but he failed to advise
her as to her tax liability. Under the circumstances, if the wife had filed
separate returns, she would have been liable for taxes owed on one-half of
the community income, but for no more. Having filed a joint tax return the
wife was jointly and severally liable for the taxes owed for the entire commu-
nity income, as well as for penalties and interest. The couple were later
divorced, and the husband became a bankrupt. The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice thereafter seized the ex-wife's separate home and sold it and she was
liable thereafter for a substantial deficiency. The ex-wife sued the lawyer
and the accountant on the ground that she was the client of each of them,
and each had failed to represent her properly. The court held that the filing
of the tax returns was "a matter incidental to the representation" of the
husband in a criminal prosecution.' 9 The court further held that no attor-
ney-client relationship between the lawyer and the wife existed, although an
issue of fact remained as to whether the attorney had been negligent in fail-
ing to advise the wife that he did not represent her.12 0 The court also reiter-
ated the well-established proposition that neither spouse acts for the other as
114. TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 5.61(b) (Vernon 1975).
115. All jointly managed community property is liable for either spouse's debts. Id.
§ 5.61(c).
116. 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (1988).
117. Medaris, 884 F.2d at 836.
118. Parker v. Carnahan, 772 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ).
119. Id. at 156.
120. Id. at 157. Texas Code of Professional Responsibility DR7-104 (A) (2), in effect at the
time, did not deal with a lawyer's duty in dealing with unrepresented persons. Rule 4.3 (effec-
tive Jan. 1, 1990) now addresses that point specifically.
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a matter of law 21 and held that the wife had not authorized her husband to
act for her 22 in hiring an attorney or an accountant. The court went on to
state that the attorney did not control the accountant's work in this instance,
and that the wife had no direct dealings with the accountant. Whether the
accountant negligently failed to advise the wife concerning the consequences
of the joint income tax return remained a question of fact.
Turnover Orders. Amid a flury of conflicting opinions from courts of ap-
peal,123 the Texas Supreme Court reversed' 24 the conclusion of a Houston
appeals court that ordering a debtor to turnover 25 his wages when received
is invalid because it thwarts the purpose of the constitutional prohibition
against garnishment of wages.' 26 Although the supreme court unanimously
held that the order was constitutional because it did not affect wages in the
hands of the employer, the court did not agree as to whether a court could
enforce its order by citation for civil contempt. 127 One judge favored such
enforcement while four others opposed it and the other four left the point
open for further decision.' 28 In another case' 29 an order directing the execu-
trix of the estate of a deceased judgment-debtor to turn over assets for execu-
tion was reformed to require the creditor to make a factual showing that the
party from whom property was sought actually held such property. Such a
showing is closely associated with enforcement by civil contempt.' 30
Homestead Designation and Extent. Once a homestead is established on
property, protection of the homestead exemption is not lost by one spouse if
the other spouse abandons the property. After a judgment was rendered
against him, the husband in Taylor v. Mosty Brothers Nursery, Inc. 31 con-
veyed his interest in the community homestead to his wife and left the state.
Thus, the wife became the owner as well as the occupier of the whole prop-
erty. The conveyance, however, in no way affected the exempt character of
121. Wilkinson v. Stevison, 514 S.W.2d 895 (rex. 1974); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 4.031(c) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
122. Parker, 772 S.W.2d at 157.
123. In Maumus v. Lyons, 771 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ), the
court viewed the turnover statute as unconstitutional. In four earlier instances appellate courts
had held the statute constitutional. Cain v. Cain, 746 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1988,
writ denied); Barlow v. Love, 745 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. App.-Waco 1988, writ denied); Salem v.
American Bank of Commerce, 717 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1986, no writ); Sloan v.
Douglass, 713 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In two recent
cases, the courts held the statute constitutional. Caulley v. Caulley, 777 S.W.2d 147, 151 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ); Buttles v. Navarro, 766 S.W.2d 893, 894-95 (rex.
App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
124. Raborn v. Davis, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 249 (Feb. 21, 1990), reversing Davis v. Raborn,
754 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988).
125. The order was made pursuant to TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 31.002 (Vernon
1986).
126. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 28.
127. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 249-50.
128. Id.
129. Buller v. Beaumont Bank, 777 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ)
(Brookshire, J., dissenting at 772).
130. See Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948); Ex parle Gonzales, 414 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.
1967).
131. 777 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
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the property even though the husband's creditor had abstracted the judg-
ment. In this instance, the wife later sold the premises and brought suit
against the creditor for a declaratory judgment that the entire proceeds were
exempt from execution for six months. 132 The appellate court reversed the
trial court's conclusion that as much of the proceeds as represented the hus-
band's share was subject to the creditor's judgment. The wife had had a
homestead interest in the entire property prior to her husband's abandon-
ment of it.133 Further support for the court's conclusion may be found in
the fact that the holder of exempt property may transfer it to a third person
free of any judgment lien that would have attached to the property if it had
not been exempt; a creditor cannot object to a debtor's disposition of some-
thing the creditor cannot reach134 unless the creditor resorts to putting the
debtor in bankruptcy.1 35 Thus, once the property has passed to someone
else, it is no longer the debtor's property.
A close case for analysis is that of a childless couple on a rural homestead.
A rural family homestead may consist of up to two hundred acres while a
homestead for a single person may only cover one hundred acres. If the
husband conveys his share of a community tract of over one hundred acres
to his wife and abandons her and the homestead with the intention of bring-
ing suit for divorce, the extent of the wife's claim is brought into sharp focus.
If the divorce occurs, the size of the exemption will contract by virtue of the
fact that both former spouses become single. But as long as a family exists,
the family homestead continues. 136 Since the amendment of the Texas Con-
stitution in 1973 requiring both spouses to abandon a homestead for its char-
acter to be lost, 137 abandonment by only one spouse does not affect the
family homestead rights of the other.
As part of the urban residential homestead of one acre, a debtor can claim
urban business premises. 138 In In re Krug139 the bankruptcy court reiter-
ated the proposition laid down by the Texas Supreme Court in Ford v. Aetna
Insurance Co.140 that all parts of business premises classified as exempt must
be "necessary to the business" and not merely used "in aid of" or "in con-
132. TEx. PRop. CODE ANN. § 41.001(c) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
133. Taylor, 777 S.W.2d at 570.
134. Sorenson v. City Nat'l Bank, 121 Tex. 478, 485,49 S.W.2d 718, 721 (1932); Du Perier
v. Du Perier, 126 S.W. 10 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1910, writ ref'd).
135. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 522(g) (1982). See also McKnight, Prefiling Ex-
emption Planning: A National Perspective in 2 J. NORTON, M. ROCHELLE, & P. FRANKLIN,
REPRESENTING DEBTOnS IN BANKRUPTCY 3-1, 3.03 at 3-10 to 3-13 (1988).
136. A family homestead does not terminate as a result of dispersal of all but one member
of the family unit. Wood v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 588, 19 S.W.2d 35 (1929).
[The homestead is an estate created not only for the protection of the family as
a whole, but for the units of the family, including those who survive, and em-
bracing the head of the family at the time of dissolution, whether the dissolution
has been brought about by death or dispersal, as distinguished from a mere priv-
ilege accorded the head of the family for the benefit of the family as a whole.
11 Tex. at 590, 19 S.W.2d at 36.
137. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
138. Id. art. XVI, § 51; Tnx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
139. 102 Bankr. 98 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
140. 424 S.W.2d 612, 616 (Tex. 1968).
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nection with" it.14 1 Thus, if the test of Ford cannot be met, those parts of
the premises not required for business operations are not entitled to the
homestead exemption.
Liens on Homesteads. A question of designation of rural land as a home-
stead arose in Lane v. Small Business Administration.142 The issue turned on
the effect of a disclaimer of homestead in the course of mortgaging the prop-
erty for a business loan. In 1968 the debtor-couple leased a 200 acre farm
where they made their home. In 1975 the couple bought a 158 acre farm a
few miles away. This farm was the only fee interest in realty held by them,
and they farmed it continuously thereafter. The couple gave a mortgage on
their 158 acres in 1977 and stated that the 200 acre farm was their home-
stead and the 158 acre tract was not their homestead. In 1984 the husband
put a trailer house on the 158 acres and occupied it occasionally while farm-
ing the land. The family moved briefly into town in 1985 and in the follow-
ing year took up residence on the 158 acres. In their subsequent bankruptcy
the couple asserted that the 158 acres was their rural homestead and that the
lien on the property was therefore void. The bankruptcy court held that
they were estopped by their 1977 denial of homestead when the loan was
made, and that this denial was consistent with the physical facts. 143 Some
authority suggests that a leasehold may be asserted as a homestead, 144
although a tenant's reason for making such an assertion may be of very dubi-
ous wisdom. In 1977 the couple might have chosen either the leasehold
property or the fee interest, or parts of each, as their homestead. 145 They
chose the former. Because their assertion was consistent with the facts of
use of the land, their representation bound them.146
Once property is designated as a homestead, it is no longer available to be
given as security for a loan except for the three purposes specified in the
Texas Constitution.147 The Internal Revenue Code,148 nevertheless, allows
tax deductions for the payment of interest on any loan on the family home.
It has, therefore, been proposed at the last two regular sessions of the Texas
Legislature that a statute should be enacted allowing non-enforceable liens
on homestead property so that lenders would feel more comfortable in mak-
ing such loans and so that the interest on the loans could be deducted for
federal income tax purposes. The legislature resisted the opportunity to pass
the bill on both occasions. Apart from the impropriety of enacting clearly
unconstitutional legislation, the legislature declined to act because such a
law would encourage putting invalid liens on property. Such purported liens
141. Krug, 102 Bankr. at 99-101.
142. 103 Bankr. 816 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).
143. Id. at 818.
144. Johnson v. Martin, 81 Tex. 18, 21 (1891); Sterling Nat'l Bank v. Ellis, 75 S.W.2d 716,
720 (rex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1934, writ dism'd).
145. Lane, 103 Bankr. at 818.
146. Hughes v. Wruble, 131 Tex. 444, 448, 116 S.W. 2d 368, 370 (1938).
147. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 50; TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(b) (Vernon Supp.
1990). The three excepted instances are liens for purchase money, improvement, and taxes on
the property.
148. Internal Revenue Code, 28 U.S.C. § 163.
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appear to have prima facie validity once the property ceases to have home-
stead character. Thus, a later owner of the property would be forced to clear
the cloud from the title, which should not have been burdened with a sham
lien from the outset. Such an apparent lien also greatly reduces the value of
the property because the anticipated expense of removing the cloud on the
title is a deterrent to buyers. More significantly, however, such a statute
would encourage the imposition of sham liens that would become enforcea-
ble by a bona fide purchaser of the security interest.149
The documents generating the dispute in In re Shults 150 also attempted to
fix an impermissible lien on homestead property. The lender prepared the
documents reciting that the loan effected a partition between cotenants. The
transaction, however, actually consisted of nothing more than a purchase by
the owner of a one-third undivided interest in the realty of the other undi-
vided two-thirds, and the loan was made for that purpose. Because the
transaction was described as a partition, the lender asserted an owelty lien
against the entire property rather than merely against the undivided two-
thirds which was purchased. Owelty arises only in connection with a parti-
tion, however. It is an amount paid by one cotenant to another for the pur-
pose of equalizing shares in a partition. Thus, if cotenants partition property
in unequal shares, an owelty lien can be placed on the greater share in favor
of the taker of the lesser share in order to satisfy the difference.
The buyer in Shults had established a homestead on the property by con-
sent of his cotenants prior to the purchase. If the coparceners had sought to
partition the property, an owelty lien could have been put on either share.
An owelty lien can be fixed upon a homestead in such an instance. 151 But in
this case one cotenant chose to buy the shares of the others and procured a
loan to achieve the purchase.152 The lender presumably included the recital
as to partition with owelty in the loan documents in order to broaden its lien.
Because there was neither a partition nor a fixing of owelty in this transac-
tion, the lender's effort failed. The homestead claimant in Shults made an
equally untenable argument that he was entitled to claim a homestead in a
specific part of the land as though a partition had occurred. No partition
had occurred, however, and the claimant simply owned a one-third undi-
vided interest in the land not subject to the lender's lien. On foreclosure and
sale of the lender's interest, the claimant would still have a one-third undi-
vided interest subject to a partition at the instance of either cotenant.
In order to use homestead property as security for a business loan, the
owner typically avoids the rules against mortgaging by conveying the home-
stead property to a corporation so that the corporation may mortgage the
149. See Davis v. Hawn Lumber Co., 193 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1946,
no writ); Uptmor v. Janes, 210 S.W.2d 235, 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1948, no writ).
150. 97 Bankr. 874 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989).
151. Sayers v. Pyland, 139 Tex. 57, 161 S.W.2d 769 (1942); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Nauert,
200 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1941, no writ).
152. An owelty lien is in the nature of a purchase money lien, Shults, 97 Bankr. at 878. A
purchase money lien can be properly fixed on homestead property. TEx. CONST. art. XVI,
§ 50; In re Miller, 58 Bankr. 192, 197-99 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985).
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property. Once title to the land has passed to the corporation, the property
loses its exempt status because a corporation cannot assert a homestead ex-
emption.1 53 The dispute in In Re Girard 15 4 arose from such a transaction.
Having been advised by a lender that it would not lend money on the secur-
ity of their homestead, the spouses incorporated their business and conveyed
the homestead property to the corporation. The corporation then borrowed
money from the lender, using the residential property as security. Another
lender lent money to the corporation two years later for the purpose of im-
proving the property and repaying the initial loan. The subsequent lender,
therefore, succeeded by assignment to the position of the prior lender with
the same property held as security. In their later personal bankruptcy, the
spouses claimed the property as their homestead and sought to invalidate the
lien against it as based on a "pretended sale" which is condemned by the
Texas Constitution 55 as a means of circumventing the constitutional rule
that a lien on a homestead is void unless given for purchase money, improve-
ment, or payment of taxes on the property.1 56 Relying on Moore v. Cham-
berlain,157 which turned on the proposition that a grantee of a mortgage who
takes with notice of a flaw in the transaction cannot be a bona fide pur-
chaser, the homestead claimants attempted to impugn the second lender's
standing to assume the prior lien by showing that the second lender had
notice that the claimants maintained their home on the premises when the
first lien was assigned. But, because the initial conveyance of the property to
the corporation was valid and the security for the first lien was valid, the
spouses' continued open use of their property as their residence was
irrelevant. 15 8
Exempt Personalty. Since the personal property exemption statute was
revised in 1973, Texas has offered a catalogue of items that a debtor may
claim as exempt within value limitations: $30,000 for a family and $15,000
for a single adult.' 59 For the purpose of establishing a claim for exemptions
a family has been construed to mean a support relationship that does not
153. The homestead may be claimed only on behalf of a family or a single adult. TEX.
CONST. art. XVI, § 50; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002 (Vernon 1990). Neither a corpora-
tion nor a partnership may claim a homestead exemption.
154. 104 Bankr. 817 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989). In re Loter, 2 Tex. Bankr. Ct. Rptr. 362
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988), was a case of similar facts, and it was similarly resolved. In In re
Brooks, 103 Bankr. 123, 125-26 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988), a bankrupt partner was unsuccessful
in claiming a homestead in partnership property.
155. "All pretended sales of the homestead involving any condition of defeasance shall be
void." Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 50. Although counsel often argue in much broader terms, the
language of § 50 does not condemn all sales that are artificially contrived to avoid the stric-
tures of the homestead law. The kind of transaction that the language of § 50 was meant to
preclude was the mortgage in the form of a sale but understood by the parties to be a
mortgage.
156. Id.
157. 109 Tex. 64, 195 S.W. 1135 (1917). See Girard, 104 Bankr. at 819, n.4.
158. Girard, 104 Bankr. at 821-22.
159. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001 (Vernon 1986). In bankruptcy, a claimant of ex-
empt personalty, as well as exempt realty, must assert his claims with sufficient specificity so
that his creditors can appreciate what property is claimed. In re Wright, 99 Bankr. 339, 341-
42 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989).
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necessarily involve a married couple or a parent-child relationship. 160 The
body of law construing the family is not vast, but it is nonetheless notable
and fundamentally consistent. The most recent case is In re Leva,161 where
the court recognized a family consisting of an unmarried, but engaged, man
and woman who had lived together for nearly five years, the woman's teen-
age son by a prior marriage, and the man's mother. The man was thereby
allowed to claim up to $30,000 worth of exempt personalty in bankruptcy.
In Leva the court also made some observations with respect to personal
property that meets the definitions laid down in Property Code section
42.002.162 The debtor claimed that the proceeds of an insurance policy, paid
for theft of a portable telephone and a hand-held recorder were exempt as
representing 163 the stolen items, which qualified either as "tools of trade'" 64
or "home furnishings."' 165 Although the court did not specifically indicate
the debtor's trade, it is apparent that he was engaged in selling goods or
services. The court rejected his claim in both categories. The court observed
that, though the articles might be useful or convenient, they were not actual
tools of his trade in a strict sense.166 Nor in this court's view could they
qualify as household furnishings, as they were not "the sorts of items one
might furnish one's house with."1 67
The principal thrust of the long opinion in Leva is, however, to develop
tests for determining when jewelry may be properly classified as "reasonably
necessary . .. clothing" within Property Code section 42.002(3)(C).168
Before the "reasonably necessary" standard was added to the personal prop-
erty exemption statute in 1973, courts were very lenient in treating jewelry
as within the "wearing apparel" exemption. 169 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals discussed the applicability of the wearing apparel exemption to jew-
elry in In re Fernandez.17 0 The court noted that the substitution of "cloth-
ing" for "wearing apparel" in the non-substantive revision of the statute in
1983 did not affect the meaning of the statute but went on to point out that
not all jewelry qualifies as exempt. 171 To qualify, the jewelry must be worn
160. See Central Life Assurance Soc'y v. Gray, 32 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App.-Wac
1930, writ ref'd); see also Hutchenrider v. Smith, 242 S.W. 204 (rex. Comm. App. 1922,
recommendation accepted) (three daughters who cared for aged father in their home); Henry
S. Miller Co. v. Shoaf, 434 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (divor-
cee and her dependent mother).
161. 96 Bankr. 723, 736-38 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
162. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002 (Vernon 1986).
163. Willis v. Schoelman, 206 S.W.2d 283, 284 (rex. Civ. App.--Clveston 1947, no writ);
Mosely v. Stratton, 203 S.W. 397, 398 (rex. Civ. App.-Austin 1918, no writ). In Sorenson v.
City National Bank, 121 Tex. 478, 485, 49 S.W.2d 718, 721 (1932), the court observed that by
analogy to the statute making the proceeds of sale of exempt realty exempt for six months, fire
insurance proceeds for the loss of household furnishings are exempt "for a reasonable time."
164. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(3)(B) (Vernon 1984).
165, Id. § 42.002(1).
166. Leva, 96 Bankr. at 738-39.
167. Id. at 738.
168. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(3)(C) (Vernon 1986).
169. See Olds & Palmer, Exempt Property in CREDITOR'S RIGHTS IN TEXAS 23, 45-49 (1st
ed. 1963, J. McKnight, ed.).
170. 855 F.2d 218, 221 (5th Cir. 1988).
171. Id. at 221.
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by the owner.172 The court added that jewelry purchased with concern for
investment or resale tends to detract from its being regarded as "reasonably
necessary" to the debtor. 173 Although some purchasers of jewels are un-
questionably victims of retailers' advertisements concerning "investments"
in jewelry, instances when a purchase of jewelry can be objectively accepted
as an investment must be comparatively rare. 174 The amount paid for the
jewelry must surely be a significant fact in making this determination.
In Leva the court put significant emphasis on the frequency of use of par-
ticular jewelry claimed as exempt, as well as its sentimental value to the
debtor and the loss of personal dignity its deprivation would entail. The
court also commented that a claim of a large number of jewels as exempt
makes it less likely that all pieces are reasonably necessary. In this case, the
court concluded that the debtor's Rolex watch should be set aside as exempt
wearing apparel, whereas a diamond ring and a gold bracelet were not ex-
empt because the latter two objects were mainly meant to impress others,
and the debtor's being deprived of them would not destroy his dignity. De-
spite the court's thoughtful and witty discourse on the abstract aspects of the
personal property exemption law, it is hard to know precisely how the court
reached its decision in this case. Apart from the utilitarian quality of the
watch,175 unspecified subjective elements also appear to have contributed to
the conclusion.
The length of the discussion that stems from the "reasonably necessary"
test suggests that the recommended repeal of that standard would be salu-
tary. The principal objection to the "reasonably necessary" test in practice
is that it requires a judicial determination in almost all instances. Although
the Property Code's definition of exempt property is also employed by bank-
ruptcy courts,17 6 where a judicial determination of the exemption claim is
made as a matter of course, the principal purpose of the state law is to define
property not subject to seizure for creditor's claims by the processes of exe-
cution or attachment. Because a "reasonably necessary" test requires re-
course to judicial interpretation with respect to a resisted seizure under both
writs, the test is unnecessarily burdensome. Without the "reasonably neces-
sary" standard, some jewelry might still be treated as exempt and some not,
and "the relationship of the debtor to the jewelry",17 7 both as to frequency
172. Id.
173. Id. at 222. Luxury household furnishings acquired for speculation or investment pur-
poses have also been declared as not exempt, although household furnishings are not subject to
the "reasonably necessary" test. In re Rowe, No. 284-20097, slip op. at 19-20 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. March 14, 1985), noted in McKnight, Family Law, Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 40 Sw. L.J. 1, 25 (1986). Rowe is not, therefore, a very convincing authority.
174. See Epstein, Have You Ever Tried to Sell a Diamond?, 249 THE ATLANTIC 23 (1982).
175. In a later case, In re Mitchell, 103 Bankr. 819, 820 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989), the same
court compared other jewelry with "such comparatively utilitarian items as watches and ear-
rings." The utility of watches is understood; that of earrings is not explained. One may imag-
ine that they may anchor ears which are apt to blow in the wind, but whether the application
of weights is useful to hearing is unknown.
176. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988).
177. Leva, 96 Bankr. at 725.
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of use and personal attachment, would still be relevant. But the courts' task
in applying the law evenly and objectively would be greatly eased.
The tone of the court's discussion in Leva indicates that the court sub-
scribes to the principle of mutually exclusive categories of exemptions cata-
logued in the statute. 178 Other courts179 have also followed this line of
reasoning, but it is clearly contrary to the intent of the legislative draftsmen,
as determined from the statute's legislative history.180 The fact that a partic-
ular item of personalty may be exempt under one subsection of the statute
does not mean that similar personalty is not equally exempt under another
section or subsection of the statute. Thus, if only two vehicles are exempt as
means of transportation, a third vehicle may also be exempt as a tool of
trade.181
The same court that decided Leva again considered the valuation of items
of jewelry within the $30,000 limit allowed to a family as exempt personalty
in In re Mitchell.18 2 The value of a 6.18-karat diamond was in question.
The creditor offered evidence of an appraiser that the "estate value" 18 3 of the
stone was just over $42,000, but its fair market value was only $36,000. The
debtors purchased the ring in 1978 for over $36,000. The original seller tes-
tified that he would buy it for $7,800. The court accepted $36,000 as the fair
market value-the standard accepted by both federal and Texas authorities
in such instances.18 4 In the course of its discussion the court analyzed the
function of the Texas exemption law and its value-limitation. At its 1989
regular, session the legislature discussed a proposal that the value-limits
should be raised by a hundred percent or more to reflect inflation that had
occurred since the amount was set in 1973. Those opposed to the increase
pointed out that, but for a recent spate of affluent bankrupts, the ordinary
bankrupt debtor of the past and present usually exhausts most of his mer-
chantable exempt personalty before reaching the bankruptcy court. The leg-
islature did not reach agreement on proposals for this and other proposed
reforms of the personal property exemption law before the legislative session
ended, although each house of the legislature passed a different form of the
bill. 185
178. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002 (Vernon 1986).
179. See, In re Weiss, 92 Bankr. 677, 678 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988).
180. See McKnight, Modernization of Texas Debtor-Exemption Statutes Short of Constitu-
tionalReform, 35 Tex. Bar J. 1137, 1138 (1972).
181. See McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 43 Sw.
LJ. 1, 25 (1989); McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
34 Sw. LJ. 115, 137 n.193 (1980).
182. 103 Bankr. 819 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989). Market value is alluded to in Leva in the
context of its relation to whether an item of jewelry is held as wearing apparel or as an invest-
ment. See 96 Bankr. at 727, 731-32, 735.
183. "The estate value is what a jewelry company would have to pay on the diamond
market to acquire the stone, as opposed to the retail market, which is what one would ask the
customer to pay for the item." Mitchell, 103 Bankr. at 820 n.4.
184. Mitchell, 103 Bankr. at 820-21.
185. In the version of the bill passed by the House of Representatives the exemption value-




It has been suggested that some sort of practical test should be used to
determine the market value of exempt personalty. Under the old definition
of urban homestead in terms of value of unimproved land, if spouses owned
a homestead exceeding the maximum value at the time of designation, the
surviving spouse was entitled to have a sale of the property to ascertain the
present value, and if the land brought less than the value-limit, the sale
would be cancelled and the property would be set aside to the debtor as
exempt.18 6 But just how such a sale might be conducted to ensure fairness
to the debtor and to the bidder is a puzzle. Under present urban conditions
it seems unlikely that such a procedure is viable in the context of personal
property exemptions.
In In re Anthony 18 7 another bankruptcy court commented on the continu-
ing dispute concerning the proper construction of section 42.001(a) of the
Property Code:
... personal property that is owned by a family and that has an aggre-
gate fair market value of not more than $30,000.00 is exempt from at-
tachment, execution, and seizure for the satisfaction of debts, except for
encumbrances properly fixed on the property.188
As the court in Anthony read the section, the question is whether "the last
phrase: 'except for encumbrances properly fixed on the property' can be
meant to modify the word 'debts' and the only thing meant by the phrase is
that such encumbrances shall be enforceable"'18 9 or that the phrase is meant
to modify the phrase "not more than $30,000.00" with the consequence that
the fair market value of encumbrances is excluded "from the $30,000.00 ex-
emption figure"190 for the purpose of applying section 522(f) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.' 91 Had the court not been restrained by the Fifth Circuit
Court's reading of the statute in In re Allen, 192 the court would have chosen
the former interpretation in determining the amount of property claimable
within the value-limitation. There is a third interpretation, however, and it
is the one intended by the draftsmen of the 1973 act: the dollar value of
property claimable as exempt refers to the value of the debtor's equity own-
ership, but the debtor's ownership in the entire item is nonetheless exempt
from seizure. 193 An amendment to make the draftsmen's original meaning
clear was included in the proposed reform of the personal property exemp-
186. Whiteman v. Burkey, 115 Tex. 400, 401, 282 S.W. 788, 789 (1926).
187. 102 Bankr. 600 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988).
188. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001 (Vernon 1986).
189. Anthony, 102 Bankr. at 602 (emphasis in original).
190. Id.
191. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1988).
192. 725 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1984). See also In re Evans, 25 Bankr. 105 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1982) (personal property exempt from seizure except to satisfy encumbrances properly fixed
thereon). This question is also alluded to in Mitchell, 103 Bankr. at 824-25 n.13.
193. See McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas law, 37 Sw.
L. 65, 88-89 (1983); see also In re Thompson, 59 Bankr. 690 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986) (De-
clining to follow In re Allen and holding that encumbered personal property may be exempt),
commented on in McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
41 Sw. L.J. 1, 27 (1987).
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tion law introduced in 1987194 and again in 1989, but on both occasions time
constraints of the legislative process disappointed these efforts for reform.
On September 1, 1987, Texas categories of exempt personalty were en-
larged to include certain types of retirement interests not subject to the mon-
etary limits set in 1973. The El Paso court of appeals has concluded, 195
however, that such exemptions may not be asserted against a writ of garnish-
ment issued for recovery of a judgment rendered prior to the effective date of
the statute creating the new exemptions. 196 The court presumably based its
conclusion on the premise that changing the rules of enforcement of contrac-
tual obligation is contrary to the provisions of the Texas Constitution. 197
Because some, but not all, of the retirement benefits made exempt by the
1987 act198 are interests defined as exempt by the federal Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),199 questions have been raised
with respect to the effectiveness of the Texas statute in the light of the doc-
trine of federal preemption. Resolution of these questions turns on the inter-
pretation of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mackey v. Lanier
Collections Agency & Service, Inc.20o In that case the Court held that ER-
ISA preempted the field relating to types of property made exempt by the
act.20 1 Texas bankruptcy courts have since been at pains to determine the
effectiveness of the Texas law with respect to ERISA related exemptions.20 2
Prior to the 1987 legislative session, at which the retirement-benefit ex-
emption was passed, both the Family Law and Tax Sections of the State Bar
of Texas perceived a need for debtor protection under Texas law in relation
to retirement benefits. The Tax Section was motivated by the 1983 decision
of the Fifth Circuit court in In re Goff,203 holding that a self-settled retire-
ment plan was not exempt under federal law. The court said that ERISA
194. See McKnight, Family Law, Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw.
L.. 1, 37 (1988).
195. Williams v. Texas Commerce Bank-First State, 766 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1989, no writ) (individual retirement account).
196. See Steves & Sons, Inc. v. House of Doors, Inc., 749 S.W.2d 172, 176 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1988, writ denied) (property code exemption not in effect when case was filed).
197. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 16.
198. Tax. PRop. CODE ANN. § 42.0021 (Vernon Supp. 1990), as clarified and amended in
1989.
199. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (Supp. 1990).
200. 486 U.S. 825 (1988), discussed in McKnight Family Law, Husband and Wife, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 43 Sw. L.J. I at 26-27 (1989). The fact that the holding in Mackey is
confined to exemption law is emphasized by a later decision dealing with the ERISA presump-
tion unrelated to exemptions in which Mackey is not so much as mentioned. Massachusetts v.
Morash, 109 S.Ct. 1668, 104 L. Ed.2d 98 (1989).
201. The provisions of ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may
now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan covered by the statute." 29 U.S.C.§ 1144(a) (1988). The scope of the phrase "relate to" has been the focus of much of the subse-
quent litigation.
202. The best treatment of the setting of the Texas law up to this point is Gote, The Texas
Exemption of Retirement Benefits: Interaction with the Bankruptcy Code and Possible Preemp-
tion by Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service, 26 Hous. L Rev. 497 (1989).
203. 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983). For more recent developments related to Goff, see In re
Brooks, 844 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1988); In re Kirk, 101 Bankr. 476 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989).
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did not make a self-settled plan exempt 20 4 and that the Bankruptcy Code did
not change this conclusion. 205 The Family Law Section, on the other hand,
was concerned that although the Bankruptcy Code offered some protection
to retirement benefits in a bankruptcy context, a broadly defined state ex-
emption was also called for to exempt retirement benefits from seizure in a
non-bankruptcy context.206 Because the Family Law Section was much con-
cerned with other exemption legislation, amendment of the law with respect
to retirement benefits was left to the Tax Section. It is noteworthy that
many other states, particularly those opting out of applicability of federal
bankruptcy exemptions20 7 for their citizens in bankruptcy, have now passed
similar legislation. 208
In four recent cases Texas bankruptcy courts have wrestled with the issues
raised by the Texas statute on exemption of retirement benefits and its rela-
tionship to ERISA.2°9 In re Laxson 210 is somewhat analogous to Mackey in
that it dealt with the exemption of an individual retirement account, exempt
under Texas law but not under ERISA. The court held that the preemption
doctrine was, therefore, not in issue and upheld the state exemption.211 In
three other cases, however, the preemption problem was squarely in issue.
In In re Dyke212 the bankruptcy court was constrained by the Goff and
Mackey decisions to sustain the debtor's reliance on the Texas exemption
law. Furthermore, the court rejected the debtor's argument that the
Supreme Court in Mackey implicitly overruled the conclusion in Goff that
the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code213 do not provide protection to a
debtor not subject to ERISA preemption.
On the other hand, In re Volpe 214 looked to congressional intent as the
touchstone for resolution of the controversy. Examining the Texas statute in
light of federal law, the court stated that if the Texas exemption provision
purports to regulate retirement plans and their administration, it is pre-
204. Goff, 706 F.2d at 582.
205. Id.
206. Although some members of the Council of the Family Law Section were concerned to
put a financial cap of at least $100,000 on the amount of pension benefits that could be shielded
from creditors (and some bankruptcy judges thought that amount outrageously high), the Tax
Section favored no cap at all. New York's statute has a $30,000 limit on exempt retirement
benefits. N.Y. Civ. PitAc. L & R 282-283 (McKinney Consol. Supp. 1990).
207. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1988).
208. See, eg., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1126B (Supp. 1990); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-
66-220 (1987); CAL. Civ. PRAC. CODE § 703.140(10)(E) (West Supp. 1990); CoLo. REv.
STAT. § 13-54-104 (1988); ILL. CODE CI.. PRAC. § 12-1006 (Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 20:33 (West 1986); Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-3-1(1)(b)(iii) (Supp. 1990); N. MEX. STAT.
ANN. §§ 42-10-1, 42-10-2 (Supp. 1990); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 282-283 (McKinney
Consol. Supp. 1990); OKLA. STAT. Am. tit. 31, § 1(20) (West Supp. 1990).
209. These developments are discussed in Peele, Retirement Plan Benefits---Are They Ex-
empt?, 53 Tex B.J. 114 (1990); see also Ballard, Bankruptcy Courts Split Over Seizing Pension
Funds, 5 TExAS LAWYER 6 (No. 7, May 8, 1986).
210. 102 Bankr. 85 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989).
211. Id. at 89.
212. 99 Bankr. 343 (Bankr. S.D. Texas 1989).
213. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988).
214. 100 Bankr. 840 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
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empted by ERISA. But the court215 concluded that the state law merely
deals with retirement benefits in their relation to third-party rights and
therefore is not preempted by federal law. The analysis is ingenious, but it
does not squarely address the decision of the Supreme Court in Mackey.
In In re Komet 216 Judge Clark of the federal Western District of Texas
withdrew an earlier opinion in that case217 and proceeded to resolve the ex-
emption problem in bankruptcy. While continuing to acknowledge preemp-
tion of section 42.0021 by ERISA, 218 the court concluded that the ERISA
exemptions are nonetheless effective under section 522(b)(2)(A), 219 which al-
lows a bankrupt debtor asserting state exemptions to claim any other prop-
erty exempt under federal law apart from the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, the
debtor may claim ERISA-protected retirement benefits as exempt because
the provisions of ERISA220 require that qualified retirement plans contain
provisions against seizure of plan funds by creditors.221 Since this analysis is
contrary to the statement in Goff 2 2 2 that Congress did not intend to include
ERISA plan exemptions within the provisions of sections 522(b)(2)(A) and
541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, the court rejected this conclusion of the
Fifth Circuit court as mistaken.223
IV. DIVISION ON DIVORCE
Jurisdiction. Commencing a bankruptcy case is sometimes used as a de-
vice to deter the filing of a divorce petition or as a means of bringing a di-
vorce proceeding to a temporary halt.224 The Bankruptcy Code225 provides
that any judicial proceeding against the debtor is automatically stayed upon
a bankruptcy filing. In Thiel v. Thiel226 the debtor husband attempted to
use this means of stalling an appeal from a divorce decree entered in a pro-
ceeding that he himself had brought. The attempt was unsuccessful. The
appellate court granted the wife's motion to proceed with the appeal, hold-
ing that this was not a proceeding "against the debtor" but the completion of
a proceeding brought by the debtor.227
In Knops v. Knops228 a decree awarding separation of the spouses was
215. Id. at 854-55.
216. 104 Bankr. 799 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989).
217. In re Komet, 93 Bankr. 498 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988).
218. Komet, 104 Bankr. at 804-805.
219. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (1988).
220. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (Supp. 1990).
221. Although this provision is usually termed an "anti-alienation provision", it is, of
course, more than that. It not only prohibits alienation by the debtor but also precludes
seizure by a debtor's creditors.
222. Goff, 706 F.2d at 580.
223. Id.
224. For an early instance of this sort of tactic, see Parr v. White, 543 S.W.2d 44 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Husband and
Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.i. 105, 130 (1977).
225. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1988).
226. 780 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
227. Id.
228. 763 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
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entered by a New Mexican court in 1987 while the spouses were living in
New Mexico. Property was awarded to each spouse as separate property
and responsibility for certain outstanding debts was also adjudicated. In a
subsequent appeal from a Texas divorce, the appellate court sustained the
trial court's denial of the wife's plea in abatement as well as her plea in
bar.229 There was no proceeding in another court on account of which the
proceeding should have been abated. Furthermore, the New Mexican decree
of separation did not constitute a bar to the Texas divorce unless the only
facts alleged in favor of a divorce were those before the New Mexican court
in 1987 and that court had the power to grant either a separation or a di-
vorce on those facts. If grounds arising since the New Mexican decree were
before the Texas court, the prior decree seems irrelevant to the Texas court's
power to grant a divorce. As the appellate court held,230 however, the di-
vorce court lacked jurisdiction to nullify any orders as to property or liabil-
ity previously adjudicated in New Mexico.
In McCaskill v. McCaskil1231 the wife commenced a suit for divorce in
November, 1985. Her husband then counterclaimed for divorce. Each of
them plead compliance with domiciliary and residence requirements. 232 The
court granted the divorce in August, 1987. As is often appropriate, the
court did not state to which party the divorce was awarded. 233 The wife
appealed, asserting, among other things, that her allegation of residence was
false. Acknowledging that the residence requirement is not jurisdictional
but merely prescribes a qualification that must be met before a divorce is
granted, the court held that the wife's judicial admission of residence barred
her from challenging compliance with that requirement. 234 Section 3.21,235
however, states that the residence of either "the petitioner or the respon-
dent" will meet the requirement. Hence, the unchallenged recital of the hus-
band's residence met the statutory requirement, whether or not the wife's
allegation was true. Assuming that the parties had not moved from the state
or county, and that residence requirements had not been met when the peti-
tion and cross-petition were filed, either party could have amended his or her
pleadings and offered proof to show that residence requirements were met
prior to the court's adjudication of divorce in 1987.236
On completion of a term of office, a judge loses authority to adjudicate
cases already heard unless properly assigned to sit as a judge of the court. In
Martinez v. Martinez 237 Judge A heard a suit for divorce and took the mat-
229. Id. at 867.
230. Id.
231. 761 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
232. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.21 (Vernon 1975).
233. Clay v. Clay, 550 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no
writ); Smitheal v. Smitheal, 518 S.W.2d 842, 848 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth (1975)), cent
denied, 423 U.S. 928 (1975).
234. McCaskill, 761 S.W.2d at 473.
235. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.21 (Vernon 1975).
236. Skubal v. Skubal, 584 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1979, writ dism'd);
Shankles v. Shankles, 445 S.W.2d 803, 805-807 (rex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969, no writ).
237. 759 S.W.2d 522 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ).
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ter under advisement. Judge B then succeeded Judge A on the bench.
Thereafter A purported to enter a decree in the case. Such a decree is
void.238
Interlocutory Orders. While the judiciary strives to deal with existing
rules, the legislature continues to refine the process of granting and enforcing
orders made in the course of a divorce proceeding. Under section 3.58,239 as
amended in 1983, on filing a suit for divorce a spouse could not be excluded
from occupancy of the family residence by a temporary restraining order.
Such orders were available, however, under section 71.15240 prior to filing
for divorce. It was, therefore, common practice to use the latter section in
order to circumvent the provisions of section 3.58. After the 1989 amend-
ments to sections 71.15 and 3.58, this process is still available, but its poten-
tial for abuse has been reduced by the requirement of an affidavit, testimony,
and judicial findings.241 In 1989 references to section 3.581242 were also ad-
ded to section 3.58,243 and sections 3.581 and 3.58224 were clarified in rela-
tion to protective orders concerning family violence.
Whatever the scope of such orders, enforcement by contempt is not avail-
able unless the order is specific and unambiguous.245 An abstract direction
not to act "with intent to obstruct the authority of the Court to order a
division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the Court deems just
and right," though quoted from the statute itself,246 is not sufficiently spe-
cific to support an order for civil contempt. The person to whom the order
is directed is not thereby apprised of the specific acts which are ordered not
to be performed. 247
It is now well established that valid temporary orders may be entered on
the basis of a prima facie showing of an informal marriage.248 If the divorce
court then makes an interlocutory finding of an informal marriage, such an
order is not a final judgment from which an appeal may be taken.249 Nor
may an appellate court use a writ of prohibition or mandamus to disturb
such an interlocutory ruling of the trial court.2
50
In Minns v. Minns2-5 the petitioner filed for divorce in 1982. Soon there-
after the petitioner commenced an action for personal injury against the re-
238. Id. at 523.
239. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(b)(2)(A) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
240. Id.
241. Id. § 71.15(g),(h).
242. Id. § 3.581.
243. Id. § 3.58(b),(d).
244. Id. § 3.581-3.582.
245. Exparte Glover, 701 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tex. 1985); ,xparte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43,44
(rex. 1967).
246. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(a)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
247. Fx parte Higginbotham, 768 S.W.2d 4, 5 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1989).
248. Exparte Threet, 160 Tex. 482, 484, 333 S.W.2d 361, 363-64 (1960); Winfield v. Dag-
gett, 775 S.W.2d 431, 434 (rex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1989, no writ); Ex parte Ortega,
759 S.W.2d 191, 192 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988 no writ).
249. Winfield, 775 S.W.2d at 433.
250. Id. at 433-34.
251. 762 S.W.2d 675 (rex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1988, writ denied).
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spondent and others. The court consolidated these causes for trial in 1984.
After a series of preliminary procedural skirmishes252 and an order that the
divorce proceeding be held in abeyance until the personal injury action was
completed, 253 the trial court sanctioned the plaintiff by striking her plead-
ings and rendered judgment for the defendants on issues pertaining to liabil-
ity for injury.254 The plaintiff thereupon appealed the order. The appellate
court concluded that because the suit for divorce was not severed from the
personal injury action,255 the order was interlocutory and not subject to
appeal.
Denial of a motion for continuance is also interlocutory but is subject to
review on appeal after final judgment. A motion for continuance may be
motivated by a variety of objectives. For instance, respondent in Babineaux
v. Babineaux 256 was serving a term in prison for a criminal offense. A trial
setting was ordered at the behest of respondent's counsel, who certified that
all matters of discovery had been completed. Respondent's counsel thereaf-
ter filed a motion for continuance because of his client's imprisonment. The
court denied the motion and entered a decree of divorce following a hearing
on the petition. The appellate court held that the trial court's exercise of
discretion in refusing the motion for continuance was not abusive.257 The
movant's failure to show that an improper judgment had been rendered as a
result of the denial of his motiori was fatal to his appeal.258
Agreements Incident to divorce. A property settlement agreement made in
anticipation of divorce is encouraged by statute. 259 Although the agreement
may be incorporated in the decree, violation of the terms of the agreement
are enforceable as contractual terms260 and are not subject to enforcement
by contempt. 261 The interpretation of those terms are subject to the law of
contracts rather than the law of judgments.262 Thus, most disputes with
respect to property settlement agreements arise after a decree of divorce is
entered.
Although the dispute in Comeaux v. Comeaux263 turned principally on
the enforcement of a child-support order entered on divorce, there was also a
property settlement agreement that the court construed as independent of
the child-support agreement. With respect to both sorts of agreements, the
court, with one judge dissenting, laid down a startlingly broad rule for refor-
mation of such agreements: "to reflect the true, bona fide intent of the con-
252. Id. at 676.
253. Id. at 677.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 676. Judge Dunn, concurring, took a somewhat narrower view in treating the
order as interlocutory and therefore unappealable. Id. at 677.
256. 761 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1988, no writ).
257. Id. at 103.
258. Id. (citing TEx. R. APP. P. 81).
259. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.631 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
260. Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 32-33 (Tex. 1967).
261. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.631(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
262. McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. 1984).
263. 767 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ).
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tracting parties."264 In practice, this formulation may not go very far
beyond the rule enunciated in Allen v. Allen 265 that a property settlement
agreement may be reformed for mutual mistake. The'seeming breadth of the
rule, however, may unduly burden the courts with pleas for reformation and
thereby diminish the usefulness of property settlement agreements, which
give the parties great flexibility in adjusting their property rights as well as
the certainty of the terms that are reduced to writing.
Many disputes arising out of property settlement agreements, like those
involving other contractual arrangements, are resolved by the interpretation
of the terms of agreement. Hence, because a particular decision may deal
with very special terms of a contract, its precedential value may be very
limited. But such decisions nevertheless suggest admonitions to the drafts-
men of settlement agreements. In Smith v. Smith 266 the court dealt with an
agreement between the spouses to share expenses of particular community
property pending its sale. Although most of the opinion is taken up with
interpretation of the contract's particular terms, the court also conveys the
general message that if a particular remedy is specified, other remedies are
not necessarily ruled out unless the contract so provides. 267 In drafting the
document before the court in Tharp v. Tharp,26 8 the husband's counsel evi-
dently sought to provide for the disposition of all overlooked community
property in favor of his client. After an enumeration of items specifically set
aside to either the husband or the wife, the property settlement agreement
provided that "the remainder of the marital estate of the parties shall be set
aside as the separate estate ' 269 of the husband. Sixteen years later the ex-
wife asserted that the ex-husband's community retirement benefits were not
disposed of by the agreement and were therefore subject to partition.270 The
gist of the ex-wife's argument was that retirement benefits were not contem-
plated when the residuary clause was included in the agreement, and there-
fore the terms of that clause could not have referred to those benefits. The
trial court, nevertheless, found that there was no genuine issue of fact and
rendered summary judgment in favor of the ex-husband. The appellate
court pointed out that whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law
for the court.271 The terms of the agreement were unambiguous. Relying on
264. Id. at 503 (Burgess, J., dissenting, at 504).
265. 717 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tex. 1986), commented on in McKnight, Family Law: Hus-
band and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 41 Sw. L.J. 1, 29-30 (1987).
266. 777 S.W.2d 798 (rex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ).
267. Id. at 799-800.
268. 772 S.W.2d 467 (rex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
269. Id. at 468.
270. In Kirby v. Mellenger, 715 F. Supp. 349, 350 (S.D. FI. 1989), a Florida federal court
applied this much of Texas law, but overlooked the holding in Berry v. Berry, 647 S.W.2d 945
(rex. 1983), by which the partitionable share is limited to the retirement interest at the date of
divorce. See Hudson v. Hudson, 763 S.W.2d 603, 604-605 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1989, no writ); see also Baxter v. Ruddle, 780 S.W.2d 888, 889-90 (rex. App.-El Paso 1989,
writ granted) (clarifying pre-Berry decree on account of its failure to comply with Berry, in
spite of the doctrine of res judicata).
271. 772 S.W.2d at 469.
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cases in which similar language had been employed,272 the Dallas court of
appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.2 7 3
In McCaskill v. McCaskil1274 the spouses entered into a property settle-
ment agreement pursuant to Family Code section 3.631275 in which they
agreed that specific items of property should be set aside to each of them, but
the agreement contained no clause dealing with the residue. In open court,
however, the judge asked the wife whether the husband was to have the rest
of the property, and she said that he was. The court thereupon awarded the
remainder of the community property to the husband, and the appellate
court held that the wife's judicial admission supported the trial court's de-
cree.276 The only respect in which the court departed from the parties'
agreement was by awarding two automobiles to the husband. The agree-
ment specified that the cars should belong to their possessors, but the court
awarded them to the husband without hearing evidence of possession. In
remanding the case for a determination of the fact of possession and a divi-
sion of the automobiles according to the agreement, the appellate court
noted that this was not a case requiring a reconsideration of the entire divi-
sion under Jacobs v. Jacobs.277 The trial court had previously undertaken to
follow the agreement of the parties. Making a division of the cars as agreed
would give the agreement full effect.278
Turner v. Rose279 illustrates the problems faced by a trial court trying to
interpret an agreement that is not fully formulated. Both spouses had re-
ceived a tract of land as a gift from the husband's parents. At the final
hearing both testified to an understanding to create a trust in the property
for their children. The trial court merely ordered that they hold the prop-
erty as tenants in common. A decree, approved by both parties, was subse-
quently entered. On motion of the ex-husband filed seven months later, the
court entered a nunc pro tunc order creating a trust of the property in favor
of the children. The appellate court set aside this order in response to the
ex-wife's appeal, holding that if the trial court had committed an error, it
was a judicial error that could not be corrected by a nunc pro tunc order.280
Apparently the ex-wife argued that there was no error because the parties
had agreed to hold the property as coparceners and to create a trust for their
children in the future.281 The ex-husband, on the other hand, argued that
the trust was meant to be created at the time of the decree, and therefore the
decree should have been reworded by the nunc pro tunc order to achieve
that result.
272. See Jacobs v. Cude, 641 S.W.2d 258, 259 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Teaff v. Ritchey, 622 S.W.2d 589, 591 ('rex. App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ).
273. 772 S.W.2d at 469.
274. 761 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
275. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.631 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
276. 761 S.W.2d at 474.
277. 687 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. 1985).
278. McCaskill, 761 S.W.2d at 474.
279. 770 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1989, writ denied).
280. Id. at 64-65. In case of a mere clerical error, a nunc pro tunc order is appropriate.
281. Id. at 65.
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The court in Rose v. Rose2 2 applied the contract-interpretation doctrine
and concluded that a failure on the part of a claimant to prove that payment
of interest on an amount owed was agreed to as a term of the contract pre-
cluded interest on the amount ordered in the judgment in accordance with
an agreement. Thus, the law of contracts controls not only interpretation of
property settlement agreements but also their enforcement. On this latter
point Chief Judge Cadena took strong exception to what he construed as an
agreed judgment for a sum certain: "It is the judgment which earns the
interest" not the term of the contract.283
The appellate progress of the contract issue presented in Herbert v. Her-
bert28 4 has been tortuous and slow, but the ultimate remand by the Fort
Worth court of appeals in 1989 differed in only one important respect from
the same court's remand in 1985. In 1983 the ex-wife sued to collect part of
her ex-husband's military retirement benefits in accordance with their prop-
erty settlement agreement. The ex-husband asserted material breach of the
agreement by his ex-wife with the result that he was absolved from perform-
ance. The jury's finding supported the ex-husband's assertion, and judgment
was entered in his favor. On appeal, the Fort Worth court reversed on the
ground that the jury's verdict was inconsistent with the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence as to the materiality of the breach and that
the ex-husband could not assert material breach on the part of the ex-wife on
remand.285 In a holding that illustrates the unsettled state of the Texas
Supreme Court's view of its jurisdiction to review the standards applied by
the courts of appeal in reviewing insufficient evidence points rather than the
weight that the court below attaches to the evidence, a very divided Texas
Supreme Court (3-3-1)286 remanded to the court of appeals for reconsidera-
tion of the jury's verdict.
In remanding the case to the trial court, the Fort Worth court of appeals
interpreted the verdict just as it had done in 1985. The appellate court, how-
ever, did not in any way restrict the trial judge on relevant evidence that
might be introduced. As the court of appeals summarized the evidence, it is
subject to a variety of interpretations, 28 7 and because the testimony was con-
flicting, the result would turn on the demeanor of the witnesses and their
credibility. The ultimate outcome of the case, however, depends upon the
application of the law of contracts to the facts before the court. The difficul-
ties in Herbert dramatize the shortcomings of looking to the law of contracts
282. 770 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
283. Id. at 942 (Cadena, C.J., dissenting).
284. 699 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), commented on in
McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 41 Sw. L.J. 1, 31
(1987); 754 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. 1988), commented on in McKnight, Family Law: Husband and
Wife Annual Survey of Texas Law, 43 Sw. L.J. 1, 32 (1989); 774 S.W.2d I (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth, 1989, no writ).
285. 699 S.W.2d at 726-27.
286. Three judges for remand to the court of appeals, three judges for affirmance of the
trial court, and one judge for remand to the trial court for a new trial (two judges not
participating).
287. See Herbert, 774 S.W.2d at 3-7.
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alone to settle disputes concerning the division of community property in
situations involving property settlement agreements and agreed judgments.
Property Not Subject to Division. Texas courts have consistently adhered
to the rule that veterans' disability benefits are not divisible on divorce,288
either before or after McCarty v. McCarty.28 9 The United States Supreme
Court's conclusion in Mansell v. Mansel1290 that the Uniformed Services
Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA) did not make such benefits di-
visible has not altered the climate of Texas law.291 The El Paso court of
appeals held292 that Veterans Administration disability benefits of a spouse
are nonetheless subject to consideration by a divorce court in making a divi-
sion of community property, as is the case with respect to other property not
subject to division on divorce. 293
Like other separate property of a spouse, a separate homestead is not sub-
ject to divestiture.294 As an element of child support it is, nevertheless, often
appropriate for the court to award occupancy of one ex-spouse's separate
homestead to the managing conservator during the minority of their chil-
dren. To award that ex-spouse a life estate in the property, however, consti-
tutes a divestiture of the owner's separate property interest.295 In Hirsch v.
Hirsch,296 the court observed that a divestiture of the husband's separate
property does not occur when a divorce court puts a lien on non-exempt
separate realty for the discharge of a promissory note made by the husband
to the wife to compensate for the larger share of community property parti-
tioned in favor of the husband.
Making the Division. The process of division of the community estate falls
into four stages: identification of the spouses' property interests, characteri-
zation of those interests as either separate or community property, valuation
of the community property, and division of the community. Proper charac-
terization is particularly important because an error in characterization can
require repetition of the entire process.297
Valuation issues arise in several contexts. When valuing the goodwill of a
community property interest in a professional partnership, special care must
be exercised to exclude the value of the personal skill and reputation of the
288. Ex parte Burson, 615 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex. 1981); Ex parte Johnson, 591 S.W.2d
453, 456 (Tex. 1979).
289. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
290. 109 S. Ct. 2023, 104 L. Ed.2d 675 (1989).
291. Berry v. Berry, - S.W.2d -, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 357 (Tex. 1990).
292. Rothwell v. Rothwell, 775 S.W.2d 888, 891-92 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, no writ).
293. fcisSee Mattern v. Mattern, 624 S.W.2d 400, 400 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1981,
no writ). But see Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. 1979) (seeming misappli-
cation of blend of federal and California principles in Texas context).
294. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 623 S.W.2d 462,466 (Tex. App.-Waco 1981, writ dism'd).
295. LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 761 S.W.2d 450, 452-53 (rex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ
denied).
296. 770 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, no writ).
297. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731, 733 (rex. 1985). See Dawson v. Dawson, 767
S.W.2d 949, 951 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ).
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spouse in making the valuation. 298 In Keith v. Keith 299 during the marriage
the husband formed a business partnership with his son. A formula was
included in the partnership agreement for determining the market value of
the partnership in the event of termination of the partnership. The wife
joined in the agreement. Because the partnership was not being terminated,
however, the trial court regarded the formula as inapplicable to making a
valuation of the husband's partnership share on divorce. Relying on the
opinion of Judge Stewart in Finn v. Finn,3°° the appellate court held that
such an agreement was not necessarily determinative of the value of an on-
going business. 30 1
When a jury puts a valuation on assets, the court cannot treat those values
as merely advisory. InArchambault v. Archambault302 the court held that a
grossly disparate division on the basis of such a finding in the absence of any
reasonable basis for doing so constituted an abuse of discretion.
30 3
New Trial. The Texas Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the elements of
proof required to obtain 3° 4 a new trial following a default judgment applies
to default judgments taken in divorce cases on failure of a defendant to file
an answer and those entered upon for a failure to appear for trial.305 In the
case before the court, however, no default was found, even though the hus-
band failed to appear personally, because he was represented at trial by
counsel. 30 6
Appeal. In response to the 1983 decision of the Texas Supreme Court in
Ex parte Boniface,307 section 3.58 of the Family Code30 8 was amended to
give trial courts power to enter and enforce protective orders within thirty
days of the perfection of an appeal. These powers include ordering support
of either spouse during the pendency of an appeal.3 9 The trial court cannot
act on a motion for support filed beyond the thirty-day period.
3 10
When a party requests findings of fact and conclusions of law from a trial
court, the court must file such findings and conlusions within thirty days of
the date of judgment. 31 1 If the judge fails to file findings and conclusions as
required, the requesting party must call the omission to the court's attention
within five days after the thirty days has expired.312 The judge is presumed
298. Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. 1972); Rothmell v. Morrison, 732 S.W.2d 6,
17 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
299. 763 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
300. 658 S.W.2d 735, 742 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In this respect, the
opinion of Judge Stewart is a dissent and not a concurrance as it is marked.
301. 763 S.W.2d at 953.
302. 763 S.W.2d 50, 51 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ).
303. Id.
304. Craddcck v. Sunshine Bus Lines, 134 Tex. 388, 390, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (1930).
305. LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 778 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. 1989) (per curiam).
306. Id. at 865.
307. 650 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1983).
308. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(h) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
309. Id. § 3.58(h)(1).
310. Mullins v. Wright, 772 S.W.2d 580, 581 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, no writ).
311. TEx. R. Crv. P. 296-297. See Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Magallanes, 763 S.W.2d 768, 772
(rex. 1989).
312. Tx. R. Civ. P.-297.
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to be aware of a reminder filed within the five-day period. 313 If the judge
then fails to respond to the request, an appeal must be abated until the find-
ings and conclusions are entered.314
Bill of Review. In Hanks v. Rosser315 the Texas Supreme Court laid down
three basic prerequisites for a bill of review: (1) a meritorious defense on the
part of the petitioner, (2) a reason based on fraud, accident, or wrongful act
of the other party justifying the petitioner's failure to make the defense, and
(3) lack of fault on the part of the petitioner in failing to make the defense.
The court in Baker v. Goldsmith316 outlined the pretrial procedure to be
used in bill-of-review cases so that prima facie proof of a meritorious defense
could be addressed and examined to determine whether a further inquiry
should be made. 317 In cases turning on lack of notice, however, the United
States Supreme Court held in Peralta v. Hights Medical Center, Inc.,31 8 that
this ground was sufficient for granting the bill without examining other ele-
ments. With one judge dissenting, the San Antonio court of appeals held in
Morris v. Morris319 that failure of an attorney ad litem to demonstrate inade-
quacy of service by publication 320 does not bar a review. When a contested
issue of fraud is raised in a bill of review context, an issue of fact will usually
be presented that precludes a summary judgment in favor of the respon-
dent.321 If the court grants a bill of review and sets aside the prior judgment,
the new judgment is not final and appealable. 322 The court then sets the case
for trial on the merits.
Undivided Property. The Family Code323 was amended in 1987 to provide
for a just and right division of community property left undivided in a prior
suit for divorce or annulment. Haynes v. McIntosh 324 concerned a claim for
division of military retirement benefits earned by the respondent and not
dealt with in a decree of divorce entered in March, 1982.325 The suit for
division was brought in 1985 and tried in 1986 but was not decided until
mid-1988. The 1987 statute was applicable to orders entered on or after
November 1, 1987.326 The trial court awarded all the benefits to the respon-
313. Berry v. Berry, 770 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ); Anzaldua v.
Anzaldua, 742 S.W.2d 782, 783 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied).
314. Berry, 770 S.W.2d at 92.
315. 378 S.W.2d 31, 31 (Tex. 1964). In a general sense, Hanks thus replaced Alexander v.
Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 226 S.W.2d 996 (1950), as the fundamental authority on bills of
review.
316. 583 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1979).
317. For an application of this principle, see Beck v. Beck, 771 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. 1989).
318. 485 U.S. 80 (1988).
319. 759 S.W.2d 707, 710-11 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988, no writ). Judge Butts, dis-
senting at 711-12, distinguished between failure to give proper notice (void) and improper no-
tice or insufficient notice (voidable).
320. TEx. R. Civ. P. 329.
321. See Maddux v. Brownen, 759 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. App.-Waco 1988, writ denied).
322. Palmer v. D.O.K.K. Benevolent Ins. Ass'n, 160 Tex. 513, 334 S.W.2d 149 (1960);
State v. Buentello, 771 S.W.2d 708, 710 (rex. App.---Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
323. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.90-3.93 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
324. 776 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
325. The judgment thus followed the decision in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210
(1981), but preceeded the enactment of the USFSPA on September 9, 1982.
326. The effective date provision of the 1987 statute was clarified in 1989 so that the act
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dent in a take-nothing judgment. The petitioner appealed. Because no find-
ings of fact or conclusions of law were filed, the appellate court had to
presume that the trial court's judgment was supported by the facts presented
at trial, though only some of them were revealed by the incomplete record.
The appellate court concluded that the 1987 statutes governed the division
and presumed that the statute was properly applied.32 7 The court went on
to observe that in such a case the trial court must consider how the remain-
der of the property was divided in making a just and right partition.328
Other Post-Divorce Disputes. After five unsuccessful efforts to attack a pre-
McCarly329 award of part of his military retirement pay to his ex-wife, the
ex-husband brought suit to quash his ex-wife's application to the Air Force
Accounting Center, arguing that it constituted a writ of garnishment. The
trial court dismissed the suit and imposed sanctions for a frivolous suit. The
appellate court affirmed the trial court's order and applied further sanctions
for taking a groundless appeal.330
The federal courts were slightly more tolerant of a third attempt to defeat
a 1984 state court order in favor of an ex-wife for a portion of military retire-
ment pay. The ex-husband sought a mandamus against the Army Account-
ing Center. The federal district court dismissed the proceeding as one
properly within the state court system. The federal appeals court affirmed
the lower court and joined it in a warning to the litigant "to cease filing
frivolous pleadings.1331
Although debts for alimony and child-support or their equivalents332 are
not dischargeable in bankruptcy, debts incurred by way of a property settle-
ment on divorce are dischargeable.333 But an award of property in a divorce
decree cannot be undone by recourse to a voluntary bankruptcy proceeding.
In In re Eichelberger334 the divorce decree designated the husband a trustee
of the interest awarded to the wife in the husband's retirement plan. In her
ex-husband's bankruptcy the former wife sought a determination that the
damages she had suffered by the ex-husband's defalcation as trustee were not
discharged in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court found 335 that the divorce
court had imposed an express trust in the ex-husband, and therefore the
relates to decrees rendered "before, on, or after November 1, 1987." 1989 TEx. GEN. LAWS
1462, 1466 ch. 371, § 10(b). The 1987 amendments to other provisions of Chapter 3, including
§ 3.70(d), "apply to a cause of action pending on or brought after November 1, 1987." Id.
§ 10(a).
327. Haynes, 776 S.W.2d at 786.
328. Id. at 788.
329. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
330. Goad v. Goad, 768 S.W.2d 356, 360 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ).
331. Chandler v. Commander, Army Finance and Accounting Center, 863 F.2d 3, 15 (5th
Cir. 1989).
332. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1988). See In re Nunnally, 506 F.2d. 1024
(5th Cir. 1975); In re Calhoun, 92 Bankr. 686 (Bankr. W. D. Tex. 1987); In re Fox, 5 Bankr.
317 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980).
333. In re Worth, 100 Bankr. 834, 837 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989).
334. 100 Bankr. 861 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1989).
335. Id. at 864.
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exception to discharge in section 523(a)(4) 336 of the Bankruptcy Code ap-
plied to the damages claimed by the ex-wife. 337
The bankrupt ex-husband in In re Worth 338 sought to avoid a lien on
business property imposed in favor of the ex-wife to secure a note for her
share of the property. The court held339 that such a lien is not dischargeable
under the Bankruptcy Code34° as a lien impairing an exemption to which the
debtor was entitled. Though the property may have been a business home-
stead of the debtor, the encumbrance that had been fixed thereon by the
divorce court was in the nature of a purchase money lien.341 In dictum the
court indicated that it viewed the lien as attaching only to that part of the
property previously owned by the wife.342
336. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S. C. § 523(a)(4) (1988).
337. Eichelberger, 100 Bankr. at 865-67.
338. 100 Bankr. 834 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989).
339. Id. at 836-39.
340. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) (1988).
341. Worth, 100 Bankr. at 837-38.
342. Id. at 840.
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